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Summary  If  medical  complicity  is  understood  as  compliance  with  a  directive  to  act  against
the professional’s  best  medical  judgment,  the  question  arises  whether  it  can  ever  be  justiﬁed.
This paper  will  trace  the  contours  of  what  would  legitimate  a  directive  to  act  against  a  profes-
sional’s best  medical  judgment  (and  in  possible  contravention  of  her  oath)  using  Joseph  Raz’s
service conception  of  authority.  The  service  conception  is  useful  for  basing  the  legitimacy  of
authoritative  directives  on  the  ability  of  the  putative  authority  to  enable  subjects  to  comply
better with  reasons  that  already  apply  to  them.  Hence,  the  service  conception  bases  the  legi-
timacy of  practical  authority  on  a  certain  kind  of  greater  knowledge  or  expertise.  This  helps
to focus  the  conundrum  regarding  complicity  on  the  clash  of  expertise  between  the  medical
expert and  the  governing  body  tasked  with  coordinating  behaviour  and  otherwise  devising  rules
for the  social  good.  The  ethical  dilemma  presented  by  a  hypothetically  legitimate  directive  to
act against  a  professional’s  best  medical  judgment  also  serves  to  highlight  the  moral  dimension
of one’s  duty  to  obey  a  legitimate  authority.
© 2019  L’Auteur.  Publie´  par  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  Cet  article  est  publie´  en  Open  Access  sous
licence CC  BY-NC-ND  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).MOTS  CLÉS Résumé  Si  la  complicité  médicale  est  comprise  comme  le  respect  d’une  directive  visant
Joseph  Raz  ;
Légitimité  ;
à agir  à  l’encontre  du  meilleur  jugement  médical  du  professionnel,  la  question  se  pose  de
savoir si  elle  ne  peut  jamais  être  justiﬁée.  Ce  document  tracera  les  contours  de  ce  qui  légi-
timerait une  directive  visant  à  agir  contre  le  meilleur  jugement  médical  d’un  professionnel
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(et  contrevenant  éventuellement  à  son  serment)  en  utilisant  la  conception  de  l’autorité  de
Joseph Raz.  La  conception  du  service  est  utile  pour  fonder  la  légitimité  des  directives  fai-
sant autorité  sur  la  capacité  du  gouvernement  à  permettre  aux  sujets  de  mieux  se  conformer
aux raisons  qui  leur  sont  déjà  applicables.  Par  conséquent,  la  conception  du  service  fonde  la
légitimité  de  l’autorité  pratique  sur  un  certain  type  de  compétences.  Cela  permet  de  centrer
l’énigme en  matière  de  complicité  sur  le  conﬂit  d’expertise  entre  l’expert  médical  et  l’instance
dirigeante  chargée  de  coordonner  le  comportement  et  de  déﬁnir  par  ailleurs  des  règles  pour  le
bien social.  Le  dilemme  éthique  présenté  par  une  directive  hypothétiquement  légitime  visant
à agir  à  l’encontre  du  meilleur  jugement  médical  du  professionnel  sert  également  à  mettre  en
évidence la  dimension  morale  de  son  devoir  de  respecter  une  autorité  légitime.
© 2019  L’Auteur.  Publie´  par  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  Cet  article  est  publie´  en  Open  Access  sous
licence CC  BY-NC-ND  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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medical  professional’s  legal  system,  that  it  is  constitutional
and  was  issued  following  proper  legal  procedures.  In  saying  it
is  legally  valid,  we  are  not  thereby  assuming  anything  aboutn  most  discussions  of  medical  complicity  (at  least  since
orld  War  II),  the  focus  is  on  more  egregious  uses  of  medical
kill  in  ways  directly  harmful  to  the  patient  [1—4].  In  more
ecent  years,  there  has  been  an  understandable  focus  on  the
articipation  of  medical  professionals  in  torture  thought  to
e  necessary  to  save  large  numbers  of  innocents  [5—8],  and
n  the  force-feeding  of  hunger  strikers  [9—11].  These  cases
re  certainly  more  challenging  to  reach  the  morally  correct
onclusion  than  instances  in  which  the  medical  professional
s  co-opted  for  inhumane  experimentation  or  in  a  quest  of
nhancing  harm  for  military  success  [12—14,15  p.  3].
However,  if  we  are  going  to  explore  the  moral  contours  of
hen  such  complicity  might  possibly  be  justiﬁed,  we  need  an
nderstanding  of  complicity  that  doesn’t  automatically  lead
s  to  assume  that  no  justiﬁcation  can  be  found.  After  all,  if
e  deﬁne  medical  complicity  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  concep-
ually  impossible  to  justify  as  a  necessarily  wrong  act,  we
re  begging  the  question  of  whether  any  government  direc-
ive  to  act  against  the  patient’s  interests  can  be  legitimate.
evertheless,  complicity  clearly  must  involve  some  notion  of
oral  compromise  on  the  part  of  the  medical  professional,
ome  contravention  of  the  standard  medical  oath1.
For  the  purpose  of  this  paper,  I  will  deﬁne  medical
omplicity  as  compliance  with  a  demand  that  a  medical  pro-
essional  act  against  her  best  medical  judgment  with  regard
o  an  actual  or  potential  patient,  where  that  demand  is
oming  in  the  form  of  a  lawful  directive  on  the  part  of  her
egally  constituted  and  recognized  government.  This  unders-
anding  is  in  keeping  with  one  made  by  Edmund  Pellegrino,
hat  the  more  morally  problematic  instances  of  such  com-
licity  were  any  instance  in  which  the  physician2 is  required
1 Since this paper may reach legal professionals and academics, I
ave been advised to include the caveat that we are not here tal-
ing about complicity as a concept or offense within criminal law,
lthough there are some obvious areas of overlap [16 p. 132]. We
re dealing speciﬁcally with complicity on the part of medical pro-
essionals with (we will assume) lawful directives of their otherwise
egitimate governments.
2 I will use ‘‘physician’’ and ‘‘medical professional’’ somew-
at interchangeably. Of course, not all medical professionals are
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elfare  of  the  patient  [13  p.  372—3].  This  understanding
learly  side-lines  some  instances  of  concern,  such  as  those
n  which  the  medical  professional  is  faced  with  the  ques-
ion  of  whether  to  use  medical  knowledge  obtained  through
ast  immoral  actions  for  the  beneﬁt  of  the  patient  facing
er.  It  also  marginalizes  instances  where  the  medical  profes-
ional  is  faced  with  a  simple  conﬂict  between  her  medical
uty  and  her  own  reasons  of  prudence.  While  some  instances
n  which  a  government  is  demanding  an  act  or  information
rom  a  physician  will  be  ones  in  which  the  government  is
aking  threats  to  the  physician  as  well,  we  will  assume  that
hose  threats  do  not  themselves  bear  upon  the  morality  of
he  decision  the  physician  faces3.  The  deﬁnition  I  suggest
ill  help  us  to  focus  on  the  tension  between  what  might  be
egitimate  governmental  interests  and  the  interests  of  the
atient  facing  the  medical  professional.
Our  deﬁnition  of  complicity  includes  the  stipulation  that
he  directive  which  creates  the  challenge  of  complicity  is
awful  and  coming  from  an  otherwise  legitimate  govern-
ent.  This  also  needs  to  be  unpacked  a  bit.  In  saying  that  it
s  a ‘‘lawful  directive’’,  we  are  assuming  that  the  directive
s  legally  valid,  in  keeping  with  validity  conditions  for  thathysicians, and there may be aspects of the moral calculation that
re more applicable to physicians, and others more applicable to
sychologists, nurses, paramedics, etc. Where these distinctions
re relevant, they will be highlighted, but otherwise the two will be
reated as equivalent. One additional factor we will discuss brieﬂy
s whether the medical professional has taken an oath not to do
arm.
3 This assumption is very likely counterfactual. Where the phy-
ician’s profession garners a livelihood upon which others depend,
hreats to that livelihood certainly have moral implications for the
hysician’s non-professional duties. Similarly, threats to the phy-
ician’s person or liberty may have implications for the wellbeing
r happiness of others. But we will bracket these considerations
n order to focus on the conﬂict between the directive and the
hysician’s medical duties.
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aMedical  complicity  and  the  legitimacy  of  practical  authority
the  morality  of  the  directive  itself.  Some  might  think  this
commits  us  to  a  legal  positivist  way  of  looking  at  the  law
[17,18].  But  it  would  also  be  consistent  with  some  weaker
versions  of  natural  law  (in  which  immoral  positive  laws  are
still  legally  valid,  though  defective)  [19,20].  In  saying  that
the  government  is  ‘‘otherwise  legitimate’’,  I simply  mean
to  assume  away  cases  in  which  the  government  is  so  morally
defective  that  none  of  its  directives  can  possibly  obligate.
We  will  see  shortly  that  legitimacy  is  not  an  all-or-nothing
affair  when  it  comes  to  political  obligation4.  By  focusing  only
on  those  cases  where  it  is  possible  for  the  government  to
issue  morally  binding  directives,  I  am  hoping  to  focus  on  the
instances  in  which  medical  complicity  is  a  moral  conundrum
for  the  medical  professional.  If  the  government  was  inca-
pable  of  issuing  morally  binding  directives,  then  its  directive
for  the  professional  to  do  something  against  her  better  medi-
cal  judgment  could  only  give  a  prudential  reason  (e.g.,  to
avoid  sanction),  which  we  have  already  assumed  does  not
itself  present  a  moral  reason  that  needs  to  enter  our  conside-
ration  here.  Furthermore,  we  would  be  back  in  the  position
of  begging  the  question  against  the  possibility  of  a  morally
binding  obligation  to  be  complicit.
The  question  is  then  essentially  what  could  make  a  legal
directive  to  a  medical  professional  to  act  against  her  better
medical  judgment  morally  legitimate.  The  focus  on  legiti-
macy  is  apt  because  we  are  concerned  precisely  with  what
could  be  the  moral  justiﬁcations  for  compliance  with  these
directives.  That  is,  a  concern  for  the  conditions  of  legiti-
macy  of  a  legal  directive  is  one  that  focuses  on  its  moral
justiﬁability,  its  moral  authority,  what  gives  the  commander
a  right  to  issue  the  directive  and  thereby  give  the  subject
the  duty  to  comply5 [33—35].  Hence,  we  are  not  concerned
with  mere  power  (understood  as  the  ability  of  the  comman-
der  to  get  others  to  comply).  Nor  are  we  concerned  with  de
facto  authority  understood  as  the  belief  that  the  comman-
der  has  the  right  to  command.  We  are  concerned  with  what
people  are  attempting  to  track  with  their  judgments  about
legitimacy,  rather  than  the  beliefs  that  are  a  result  of  those
judgments.  Some  might  think  that  de  facto  authority  is  the
only  kind  of  authority  that  need  concern  us.  Even  if  there
is  something  that  people  are  trying  to  get  right  in  their
beliefs  about  legitimacy,  it  is  not  something  to  which  we
have  reliable  access;  we  cannot  be  sure  that  these  judg-
ments  are  ever  correct.  Hence,  under  this  view,  de  facto
authority  is  the  only  thing  we  can  really  talk  about.  But  in
asking  when  complicity  might  be  morally  justiﬁed,  we  are
assuming  already  that  there  is  an  answer  to  this  question
that  people  can  get  right  or  wrong.  We  are  asking  for  an
analysis  of  what  it  is  to  be  morally  justiﬁed  and  not  merely
to  be  believed  to  be  justiﬁed.  Our  question  would  otherwise
be  what  makes  people  believe  that  complicity  is  morally
4 While Jospeh Raz distinguishes between political obligation and
the obligation to obey the law [21 p. 127], we will treat these as
equivalent here, following the majority of the literature [22 p. 217,
agreeing with Raz but noting the prevalence of the conﬂation, 23].
5 Some people suggest that the right to command and the duty to
obey can come apart [24—29]. But we will follow Raz in seeing the
right to issue commands and the duty to obey them on the part of
the audience of those commands as two sides of the same coin [30
p. 235, 31 p. 6, 32 p. 1012].
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ustiﬁed,  rather  than  what  makes  those  beliefs  correct  or
ncorrect.  In  effect,  it  would  all  just  be  a  matter  of  sub-
ective  opinions  about  legitimacy;  there  would  be  no  right
nswer6. Furthermore,  if  want  therefore  to  say  that  our
nalysis  of  what  might  make  medical  complicity  morally  jus-
iﬁed  is  tracking  something  other  than  the  psychological  fact
f  beliefs  about  that  justiﬁcation,  we  are  thereby  relying  on
he  conceptual  possibility  that  the  directives  demanding  the
omplicity  are  themselves  potentially  morally  legitimate.
To  begin  our  discussion  of  the  legitimacy  of  authority,  we
eed  to  recognize  ﬁrst  that  authority  comes  in  two  ﬂavours.
ometimes  we  use  the  word  ‘‘authority’’  to  refer  to  the
reater  knowledge  of  an  expert.  Generally,  when  we  think
f  the  medical  professional  herself,  we  think  of  her  as  an
uthority  on  the  subject  of  health  and  disease  or  injuries
o  the  human  body.  When  the  physician  gives  a  directive
o  a  patient,  we  usually  think  of  that  as  a  form  of  advice,
iving  information  about  what  course  of  action  would  be
ost  beneﬁcial  to  the  patient.  While  we  might  take  it  quite
eriously,  we  don’t  usually  conceive  of  the  directive  of  the
hysician  to  the  patient  as  akin  to  the  orders  of  military
ommanders,  parents,  or  government  ofﬁcials.  In  those  lat-
er  cases,  we  say  instead  that  a  person  is  ‘‘in  authority’’
r  ‘‘in  a  position  of  authority’’  rather  than  saying  that  the
erson  is  ‘‘an  authority’’  on  a  given  subject  —  which  is  what
e  say  of  the  physician.  In  the  literature  on  authority,  this
istinction  is  explained  by  saying  that  the  authority  of  the
xpert  is  ‘theoretical’’  or  ‘‘epistemic’’  in  that  the  expert’s
ronouncements  give  you  reasons  to  believe  a  given  piece
f  information  or  interpretation  of  information,  while  the
uthority  of  the  commander  is  ‘‘practical’’  or  ‘‘deontic’’
n  that  the  commander  is  giving  you  reasons  to  act  in  cer-
ain  ways  [30  p.  8,  43,  44  p.  399,  45].  So,  the  challenge  of
egitimating  medical  complicity  is  in  navigating  a  clash  bet-
een  the  practical  authority  of  the  state  and  the  theoretical
uthority  of  the  physician.
While  this  is  an  important  distinction,  especially  for  our
urposes,  a  quick  look  at  the  authority  of  parents  and  of
ilitary  commanders  shows  that  sometimes  the  legitimacy
f  practical  authority  can  be  based  on  theoretical  autho-
ity.  That  is,  one  reason  among  others  that  we  might  have
or  saying  that  parents  have  the  right  to  give  directives  that
ught  to  be  obeyed  by  their  children  (where  the  children
re  old  enough  to  bear  this  duty)  is  that  parents  know  better
han  the  children  what  is  best  for  them.  Similarly,  military
ommanders  are  thought  to  be  in  a  position  of  greater  know-
edge  of  the  goals  of  military  action  and  facts  salient  to  the
ttainment  of  those  goals.  Even  though  they  may  not  be
irecting  their  subordinates  in  ways  that  are  best  for  those
ubordinates  individually,  we  would  still  say  that  the  subor-
inates  have  a  duty  to  sacriﬁce  their  own  interests  for  those
f  the  wider  community  (assuming  that  the  military  action
6 There are metaethical positions in which there can be no correct
oral judgments. Some say that moral claims are not judgments
t all, merely expressions of emotion [36,37]; some say all such
udgments are wrong [38,39]; some say there are no moral truths
n the basis of which such judgments can be true or false [40—42].
 admit I may be treating some or all of these metaethical positions
s incorrect in making the assumptions I do in this paper.
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no  longer  applies  because  of  more  pressing  concerns  is  one
for  whom  the  command  was  illegitimate.  If  these  considera-
tions  are  leading  us  in  the  right  direction,  we  would  want  a
7 Raz captures this intuition by saying that governments claim that
all of their legally valid directives are morally binding, but we assess 
s  itself  justiﬁed),  and  that  following  those  commands  is  the
ubstance  of  that  duty.
A  word  of  caution,  however:  to  say  that  practical  autho-
ity  can  be  based  on  theoretical  authority  is  not  to  say  that
t  can  be  reduced  to  theoretical  authority.  If  we  were  to  say
hat  practical  authority  is  reduced  to  theoretical  authority
25  p.  14,46],  we  would  be  saying  that  no  one  ever  really  gets
he  right  to  tell  others  what  to  do.  Instead,  putative  com-
anders  are  merely  giving  people  information  about  what
s  in  their  interests  or  meets  their  pre-existing  duties.  This
osition  is  perfectly  coherent  and  can  likely  be  accommoda-
ed  by  the  analysis  of  this  paper,  although  it  implies  a certain
ind  of  philosophical  anarchism.  If  all  instances  of  suppo-
edly  legitimate  practical  authority  are  merely  instances
f  legitimate  theoretical  authority,  then  the  commands  of
utative  authorities  are  not  giving  their  subjects  any  new
easons  they  didn’t  already  have.  The  most  they  can  do
s  inform  them  of  pre-existing  reasons  to  behave  in  cer-
ain  ways.  With  this  understanding,  a  legal  directive,  for
xample,  is  generally  just  informing  us  how  to  avoid  sanc-
ion  by  telling  us  which  behaviours  will  incur  it.  We  will  be
ngaging  with  a  theory  that  holds  what  legitimates  practical
uthority  is  its  ability  to  get  those  subject  to  it  to  com-
ly  with  the  best  balance  of  reasons.  A  view  that  reduces
ractical  authority  to  theoretical  authority  is  simply  holding
hat  that  best  balance  of  reasons  cannot  be  changed  by  the
ssuance  of  the  directive  itself.  But  since  it  is  very  unlikely
hat  a  demand  for  the  medical  professional  to  act  against
er  best  medical  judgment  will  be  morally  justiﬁed  unless
here  is  an  already  existing  set  of  serious  reasons  to  do  so,
t  is  highly  likely  that  the  legitimating  conditions  of  such  a
emand  will  be  the  same  whether  we  believe  it  possible  for
he  commander  to  issue  new  practical  reasons  or  only  to
eport  those  pre-existing  reasons.
While  there  have  been  many  attempts  to  justify  the
ossibility  of  legitimate  political  authority  throughout  the
ges,  we  will  focus  on  a  more  contemporary  theory,  the
ervice  conception  of  authority  advanced  by  Joseph  Raz
21,30—33,47—52].  Raz’s  theory  has  a  number  of  advan-
ages.  First  of  all,  his  theory  is  non-voluntarist  in  that  it
oesn’t  require  consent  of  the  person  subject  to  the  direc-
ive  for  it  to  be  legitimately  authoritative  [53].  Some  might
nd  it  a  bit  surprising  that  I  cite  this  as  an  advantage.  But
onsider  whether  we  really  think  that  all  instances  of  practi-
al  authority  are  only  legitimate  when  the  subject  consents.
 don’t  think  consent  is  necessary  for  parental  authority  to
e  legitimate.  Similarly,  I  can  imagine  situations  in  which  the
uthority  of  military  commanders  would  be  legitimate  even
f  those  subject  to  that  authority  were  conscripted  against
heir  will.  Finally,  even  when  it  comes  to  governments,  we
ight  wish  to  say  generally  that  government  authority  is
imited  to  governments  that  rule  with  the  consent  of  the
overned,  but  I’m  not  sure  that  is  always  the  case.  We  can
magine  situations  in  which,  because  of  some  national  emer-
ency  threatening  many  lives,  the  directives  of  an  otherwise
uthoritarian  or  undemocratic  government  become  legiti-
ate,  at  least  when  concerning  that  emergency  and  for  its
uration.As  a  way  of  testing  the  idea  of  consent  being  unnecessary
or  legitimate  authority,  away  from  governmental  situations,
onsider  the  following  thought  experiment  owed  to  Edna
llmann—Margalit  [54  p.  350—1].  You  are  in  a  room  with  two
t
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oors,  marked  (on  both  sides  of  the  door)  ‘‘A’’  and  ‘‘B’’  res-
ectively,  each  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  room  from  the
ther.  There  are  100  people  inside  the  room  and  100  people
utside  of  the  room,  spread  out  relatively  uniformly  inside
nd  outside  the  room.  Because  of  some  unspeciﬁed  emer-
ency,  all  100  inside  the  room  need  to  get  out  and  all  100
utside  the  room  need  to  get  in.  If  everyone  simply  learned
f  the  emergency  at  the  same  time,  you  can  imagine  what
ould  happen:  everyone  would  run  to  the  nearest  door  and
o  one  would  be  able  to  enter  or  leave.  But  now,  imagine
omeone  jumps  up  on  a  table  and  says  in  a  voice  loud  enough
o  be  heard  inside  and  outside,  ‘‘Use  door  A  to  exit  the  room
nd  use  door  B  to  enter  the  room!’’  No  one  inside  or  outside
he  room  consented  to  this  person’s  right  to  issue  commands.
et,  everyone  now  is  under  a  moral  duty  to  comply  with  that
ommand  as  it  solves  the  collective  action  problem  caused
y  the  emergency.
Another  advantage  of  Raz’s  theory  is  that  it  legitimates
uthority  in  a  piecemeal  way.  Just  as  in  our  thought  expe-
iment,  we  don’t  imagine  the  person’s  authority  extending
eyond  the  emergency  or  to  matters  not  covering  the  emer-
ency,  there  doesn’t  seem  to  be  a prima  facie  reason  to
hink  that  once  a government  possesses  legitimate  autho-
ity,  it  must  extend  to  all  of  the  government’s  directives.
gain,  we  are  conceiving  of  authority  as  a  right  to  control
he  behaviour  of  others  corresponding  to  a duty  on  their
art  to  obey.  It  therefore  seems  more  reasonable  that  the
egitimacy  of  that  authority  is  to  be  assessed  on  a directive-
y-directive  basis,  rather  than  in  a  blanket  way.  Granted,
e  are  used  to  thinking  about  government’s  authority  exten-
ing  to  all  of  its  directives7.  But  upon  reﬂection,  we  don’t
eally  think  even  the  most  legitimate  government  has  a  right
o  command  whatever  it  wants.  Many  situations  can  under-
ine  the  legitimacy  of  a  command  for  certain  people  and/or
t  certain  times.  Where  a  directive  couldn’t  have  conside-
ed  a  certain  exigency,  we  think  we  are  in  an  exception  to
he  legitimacy  of  that  directive.  Even  if  the  law  against  vio-
ating  posted  speed  limits  did  not  include  an  exception  for
hen  you  are  rushing  someone  to  the  hospital,  we  would  still
elieve  that  the  law  against  speeding  is  not  morally  binding
n  the  person  rushing  to  the  hospital.  We  might  say  that  cer-
ain  people  are  in  situations  of  morally  more  pressing  duties
hat  justify  their  disobedience.
One  way  to  address  this  is  to  say  that  the  directive  is
egitimate  but  outweighed  by  those  other  considerations.
owever,  if  we  are  serious  about  seeing  the  right  to  com-
and  and  the  duty  to  obey  as  opposite  sides  of  the  same
oin  here,  then  someone  in  a situation  where  his  duty  of  obe-
ience  is  outweighed  is  no  longer  bound  by  that  duty.  That
ould  be  akin  to  saying  that  the  command  was  not  issued
ith  a  right  in  that  instance.  A  person  to  whom  the  dutyhat claim on a case-by-case basis. Each directive is to be assessed
or legitimacy with regard to each subject each moment, such that
he claim could be true of a given directive for me but not you, or
rue now for me but not in ten minutes for me [33 p. 69].
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putting  the  directive  on  the  scales  in  favour  of  compliance.
In  order  to  help  her  to  act  according  to  the  best  balance
of  reasons  that  apply  to  her,  the  directive  must  exclude  at
8 To say that the reasons for the directive must ‘‘reﬂect’’ rea-
sons that already apply to those subject to the directive is not to
say that a legitimate directive cannot be based on reasons other
than those applying to the subjects. But the actions required by
the directive should be ‘‘justiﬁable by the reasons that apply to the
subjects.’’ That is, sometimes the authority may need to adopt ‘‘an
indirect strategy’’ for the subjects to comply with the best balance
of reasons [33 p. 51].Medical  complicity  and  the  legitimacy  of  practical  authority
theory  of  legitimate  practical  authority  that  explains  why  a
given  directive  might  be  legitimate  for  me  but  not  for  you,
or  legitimate  for  me  now,  but  perhaps  not  in  ten  minutes.
Raz’s  theory  does  just  that.
Raz’s  theory  captures  the  idea  that  legitimate  authority
must  be  exercised  for  the  sake  of  those  subject  to  it,  either
in  the  service  of  their  interests,  or  in  the  service  of  their  pre-
existing  moral  responsibilities,  without  making  it  depend
upon  their  consent.  After  all,  if  we  take  seriously  the  value
and  requirements  of  autonomy,  the  only  thing  that  could
overcome  the  right  to  self-determination  that  is  generated
by  that  value  is  something  that  appeals  to  a  value  that  is
more  basic  or  of  greater  import.  Raz’s  answer  is  to  base
the  legitimization  of  authority  on  the  overriding  concern  we
have  to  act  on  the  best  balance  of  reasons.  That  is,  the
value  of  autonomy  stems  from  the  fact  that  we  are  gene-
rally  in  the  best  position  to  assess  what  is  best  for  us,  given
our  own  personal  ambitions,  projects,  and  goals,  which  are
themselves  based  upon  our  individual  talents,  tastes,  and
desires,  as  well  as  our  pre-existing  moral  duties.  But  all  of
those  talents,  desires,  ambitions,  goals  and  duties  give  us
reasons  to  act  in  certain  ways.  Our  talents  and  tastes,  along
with  our  pre-existing  duties,  give  us  reasons  to  adopt  certain
goals  over  others.  When  we  decide  which  goals  to  adopt,  we
are  trying  to  assess  what  the  best  balance  of  those  reasons
are.  Once  we  adopt  those  goals,  they  give  us  further  reasons
about  how  to  pursue  those  goals.  We  decide  on  the  means  to
pursue  those  goals  by  again  trying  to  assess  the  best  balance
of  reasons  that  apply  to  us.
If  autonomy  itself  is  generally  subservient  to  the  value  of
leading  one’s  life  according  to  the  best  balance  of  reasons
that  applies  to  one,  then  it  can  and  should  bow  out  in  situa-
tions  where  acting  non-autonomously  would  aid  in  acting
according  to  the  best  balance  of  reasons.  This  is  where  the
service  conception  picks  up.  It  says  that  the  normal  way  to
justify  authority  is  to  say  that  it  is  justiﬁed  where  obedience
to  it  helps  the  subject  conform  better  to  the  best  balance
of  reasons  that  already  apply  to  her,  than  she  would  be  able
to  accomplish  if  left  to  her  own  devices.  Raz  calls  this  the
‘‘Normal  Justiﬁcation  Thesis’’  (NJT)  [33  p.  53].
Now,  one  might  justiﬁably  think  that  sometimes  it’s  bet-
ter  for  people  to  prioritize  autonomy  even  at  the  risk  of  not
acting  in  accord  with  the  best  balance  of  reasons.  That  is,
there  are  some  areas  of  human  life  where  it  is  more  impor-
tant  to  make  one’s  own  mistakes  than  it  is  for  people  to
reach  the  right  conclusion  about  what  to  do.  Raz  realizes
this  and  gives  two  examples  of  where  this  is  likely  to  be
true:  certain  matters  in  which  children  need  increasing  self-
reliance  (and  so  must  be  allowed  to  make  their  own  mistakes
in  order  to  learn  properly),  and  the  decision  about  whether
and  whom  to  marry  [32  p.  1015—6].  He,  therefore,  quali-
ﬁes  the  NJT  by  saying  that  it  is  subject  to  what  he  calls  an
‘‘independence  condition’’,  such  that  the  matter  is  not  one
in  which  it  is  more  important  for  people  to  make  mistakes
than  to  get  it  right  [32  p.  1014,  33  p.  57,  55  p.  1180].  One
might  also  wonder  how  these  areas  are  determined.  I’m  not
entirely  sure  how  to  answer  that  but  suspect  it  might  have
something  to  do  with  the  balance  of  reasons  requiring  that
some  speciﬁc  actions  be  the  result  of  one’s  own  choices.
Since  the  reasons  on  the  basis  of  which  we  are  ultimately
justifying  the  authoritative  directive  here  are  the  reasons
that  already  apply  to  the  subject,  there  is  another  condition
s
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hat  is  generally  necessary  for  the  directive  to  be  legitimate.
hat  is  the  requirement  that  the  directive  be  based  upon
or  at  least  reﬂect8) reasons  that  already  apply  to  the  tar-
et  audience  of  the  directive  [33  p.  47]. Raz  calls  this  the
‘dependence  thesis’’,  conceiving  of  these  particular  pre-
xisting  reasons  as  ‘‘dependent  reasons’’  for  the  directive
33  p.  41]. Of  course,  those  dependent  reasons  need  not  be
nes  the  subject  is  aware  of,  or  would  agree  with,  or  even
hat  are  in  her  interest  (as  reasons  —  usually  moral  —  that
pply  to  her  can  require  a  sacriﬁce  on  her  part).
When  a  directive  is  legitimate  for  a  given  subject  at  a
iven  point  in  time,  Raz  claims  that  it  presents  the  subject
ith  ‘‘pre-emptive  reasons’’  [33  p.  57].  That  is,  when  we
magine  undertaking  a decision  procedure  about  a  contem-
lated  action,  we  would  generally  add  up  all  of  the  pros
nd  cons,  thinking  of  each  as  a reason  in  favour  or  against
he  action,  giving  each  a  weight  according  to  the  strength  of
he  consideration  in  favour  or  against.  In  a  non-authoritative
ituation,  if  someone  were  to  request  that  you  undertake  the
ction,  that  request  would  count  as  an  additional  reason  in
avour  of  the  action,  with  a  weight  corresponding  to  how
mportant  it  is  to  make  the  requester  happy,  how  impor-
ant  it  is  to  the  requester  that  the  action  be  done,  etc.
e  might  similarly  say  that  if  someone  were  to  order  you
o  undertake  the  action,  that  would  count  as  some  reason
n  favour  of  undertaking  it,  even  if  we  might  discount  that
eason  because  of  thoughts  that  the  person  didn’t  express
is  desire  regarding  the  action  in  a  very  nice  way.  (Where
he  order  comes  from  someone  whom  we  wouldn’t  think  of
aving  any  right  to  order  us  around,  we  may  very  well  count
he  order  as  a  reason  against  the  action  as  well.)  But  thinking
bout  the  dependence  and  normal  justiﬁcation  theses  a  bit
hows  that  when  directives  are  legitimately  authoritative,
hey  are  a  bit  different.
In  order  for  authoritative  directives  to  perform  the
ervice  that  generally  determines  their  legitimacy,  they
ust  pre-empt  the  subject’s  reasons  against  the  action
ommanded9. They  are  authoritative  to  the  extent  that  they
re-empt  the  reasons  that  the  authority  was  meant  to  have
onsidered  in  issuing  the  directive  [21,  p.  140].  That  is,  if
egitimately  authoritative  directives  were  simply  additional
eighty  reasons  in  favour  of  the  action  commanded,  they
ouldn’t  provide  the  service  of  helping  the  person  subject  to
he  directive  to  comply  better  with  the  best  balance  of  rea-
ons.  She  would  be  left  balancing  the  reasons  as  she  sees  ﬁt,9 For Raz, to say that the directives pre-empt the subject’s rea-
ons against the action commanded does not mean that the subject
ay not still deliberate upon or consider those reasons. The subject
imply may not act upon them [33 p. 39].
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east  some  of  those  reasons  (the  ones  counting  against  the
ommanded  action)  [21  p.  140—1,  33  p.  61].
Furthermore,  since  in  order  to  be  legitimately  autho-
itative,  the  directive  is  already  based  upon  a  balancing
f  the  reasons  that  apply  to  the  subject  (along  with  other
onsiderations),  to  see  the  directive  as  simply  a  weighty
eason  (rather  than  seeing  it  as  excluding  some),  would
e  to  double  count  the  reasons  in  favour  of  the  action
hat  the  putative  authority  already  accounted  for.  That  is,
 legitimate  directive  must  be  allowed  to  pre-empt  the
alancing  of  reasons  that  the  subject  would  do  (at  least
n  determining  the  action,  if  not  the  deliberation),  since
therwise  seeing  the  directive  as  an  additional  reason
ould  be  to  give  undue  weight  to  the  reasons  in  favour  of
he  action  —  they  would  appear  a  second  time  as  the  basis
or  the  directive  [33,  p.  58].
A  legitimately  authoritative  directive,  therefore,  is  a rea-
on  to  act  in  conformity  with  the  content  of  the  directive,
oupled  with  a  reason  to  exclude  certain  reasons  not  to  act
n  conformity  with  it.  We  exclude  those  reasons  by  not  acting
pon  them.
With  this  picture  of  legitimate  practical  authority  in
ind,  let  us  return  to  the  situation  of  the  medical  profes-
ional.  Generally,  the  medical  professional’s  responsibility
o  her  patient  is  to  act  always  in  the  patient’s  best  interest
n  terms  of  the  patient’s  continued  or  recovered  health  or
ellbeing  [56—58].  An  instance  of  complicity,  we  have  seen,
ould  be  where  the  medical  professional  is  not  acting  in  the
atient’s  best  interest  as  a  result  of  other  considerations,
ere  the  lawful  directives  of  her  government.
As  we’ve  seen  using  Raz’s  theory,  even  if  we  imagine  a
aw  that  is  general  in  that  it  is  aimed  at  all  medical  profes-
ionals,  or  all  medical  professionals  in  a  certain  speciality,
r  in  a  certain  circumstance,  or  dealing  with  a  certain  kind
f  patient,  if  that  general  law  is  legitimate  at  all,  it  may
nly  be  legitimate  for  a  subset  of  those  at  whom  it  is  aimed,
nd/or  only  for  part  of  the  time  the  law  is  in  effect.  It  would
enerally  depend  upon  whether  the  law  is  helping  the  medi-
al  professionals  to  conform  better  with  the  best  balance  of
easons  that  apply  to  them  than  they  would  be  able  to  do
n  their  own.
Since  we  generally  think  that  one  of  the  highest  res-
onsibilities  of  the  medical  professional  is  to  her  patient,
t  would  likely  be  a  very  high  bar  that  would  need  to  be
vercome  for  a  directive  to  act  against  that  responsibility
o  be  legitimate.  The  only  thing  that  we  usually  think  can
ontravene  such  a  responsibility  would  be  a  more  pressing
esponsibility,  perhaps  to  another  patient  whose  needs  are
ore  severe.  Putting  aside  the  government  directive  for
 moment,  two  kinds  of  physicians  come  immediately  to
ind  who  must  balance  the  considerations  of  others  against
he  patient  in  front  of  them:  emergency  room  doctors  and
pidemiologists.  Emergency  room  doctors  of  course  must
ork  on  a  triage  system.  It  is  likely  that  what  is  in  the  best
nterest  of  the  patient  in  front  of  them  at  the  moment  is  to
e  treated  right  away.  However,  if  there  are  patients  with
reater  needs  waiting  for  treatment,  we  expect  them  to  put
side  the  interests  of  this  patient  for  the  one  with  greater
eeds  [59—62].  While  emergency  room  doctors  are  the  ones
e  expect  to  confront  this  situation  on  a  regular  basis,
e  actually  expect  almost  all  medical  professionals  to  act
pon  this  principle,  so  long  as  the  patient  with  greater
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eeds  is  one  that  the  particular  professional  can  treat.
pidemiologists  must  confront  a  similar  situation,  but  where
he  other  people  to  be  considered  may  not  yet  even  be  ill.
hey  may  be  in  a  situation  where  little  can  be  done  for  the
atient  in  front  of  them,  but  by  acting  against  that  patient’s
ndividual  interests,  a large  number  of  other  people  may
e  prevented  from  becoming  ill  [63—65]. Indeed,  this  is
ne  area  in  which  a  physician  can  function  as  a  legitimate
ractical  authority  rather  than  as  a  theoretical  authority.  In
rdering  that  a  given  patient  be  quarantined,  for  example,
he  epidemiologist  is  exercising  practical  authority  rather
han  giving  advice.  This  is  an  order  that  creates  a  duty  (and
ne  that,  in  most  cases,  the  state  is  prepared  to  enforce).
n  that,  they  may  be  helping  the  individual  infected  patient
onform  better  with  the  best  balance  of  reasons  facing  him.
t  is  likely  his  moral  responsibility  to  forgo  his  freedom,  and
ossibly  sacriﬁce  his  health  and  even  his  life,  to  prevent
thers  from  becoming  infected.  The  directive  quarantining
he  patient  is  helping  him  to  conform  to  that  overriding  rea-
on.  The  epidemiologist  is  therefore  also  prioritizing  those
ho  are  not  in  front  of  her  for  treatment  or  protection,
ver  the  patient  immediately  confronting  her.
Now,  we  may  be  tempted  to  use  emergency  room
hysicians  and  the  epidemiologists  as  models  for  when  law-
ul  government  directives  to  act  against  the  interests  of
atients  are  legitimate.  That  is,  we  might  start  by  saying
 government  directive  that  is  successfully  protecting  a
uch  larger  number  from  serious  risks,  or  is  redirecting
he  physicians’  efforts  toward  treating  those  confronting
ore  serious  threats  to  health,  is  a  legitimate  directive.
t  is  likely  that  the  government’s  central  position  gives  it
ccess  to  information  that  the  individual  physician  can-
ot  obtain  and  so  directives  based  on  these  considerations
re  helping  those  individual  physicians  to  conform  better
o  the  best  balance  of  reasons  than  she  would  be  able  to
o  on  her  own.  The  problem  is  that  this  doesn’t  look  like
omplicity  any  more.  That  is,  if  we  already  think  of  the
esponsibilities  of  emergency  room  workers  and  epidemio-
ogists  as  generalizable  to  all  medical  professionals  when
onfronting  similar  situations  (even  if  their  speciality  is  not
mergency  medicine  or  epidemiology),  then  the  directive
or  physicians  of  other  kinds  to  sacriﬁce  the  interests  of
he  patient  in  front  of  them  is  not  a  moral  compromise  of
he  kind  that  raises  the  issue  of  complicity.  The  directive  is
ot  asking  the  physician  to  do  something  that  she  doesn’t
lready  have  a  direct  medical  responsibility  to  do  (indeed,
hat  is  precisely  why  we  imagine  that  the  directive  is
egitimate).
In  order  to  reach  complicity,  therefore,  we  have  to  ima-
ine  that  the  directive  is  issued  not  for  the  sake  of  a  greater
edical  need.  Those  will  certainly  be  much  harder  to  jus-
ify,  but  perhaps  not  impossible.  First  of  all,  it  is  clear
hat  the  considerations  behind  the  government  directive
ill  have  to  be  moral  ones,  in  order  to  have  a  chance  to
e  legitimate  as  against  the  physician’s  responsibilities  to
he  patient.  We  generally  think  of  moral  reasons  as  a  kind  of
easons  that  trumps  other  kinds  of  reasons.  Since  the  phy-
ician’s  responsibilities  to  the  patient  are  themselves  moral
esponsibilities,  only  moral  reasons  behind  the  government
irective  will  have  any  chance  of  doing  a  better  job  of  pro-
iding  a  better  balancing  of  the  best  reasons  for  action  in  a
iven  circumstance.
 a
s
b
t
m
m
b
t
a
u
n
f
o
p
t
n
w
F
a
i
w
b
i
t
w
i
w
n
l
(
d
c
f
b
r
p
i
a
t
o
c
t
u
o
t
s
b
o
t
i
w
l
n
w
d
iMedical  complicity  and  the  legitimacy  of  practical  authority
One  might  imagine  here  that  the  physician’s  oath,  if
one  has  been  undertaken,  is  relevant  here.  After  all,  if
we  understand  the  oath  to  be  a  promise  to  treat  patients
a  certain  way,  then  that  would  be  an  additional  moral
consideration  against  acting  in  a  way  that  goes  against  the
physician’s  best  medical  judgment  of  the  patient’s  interest.
However,  once  the  physician  has  the  requisite  skills  to  ren-
der  aid  to  a  patient,  it  would  seem  that  the  responsibilities
to  do  so  are  already  in  place  and  that  the  oath  doesn’t  add
anything  to  the  moral  picture  [66].  Indeed,  if  we  think  of
the  oath  as  akin  to  a  promise,  it  is  not  clear  to  whom  the
promise  has  been  made:  other  physicians,  potential  future
patients,  the  physician  herself?  If  the  oath  does  have  moral
effect,  it  is  likely  only  to  magnify  somehow  the  physician’s
pre-existing  duties,  perhaps  as  against  her  other  responsibi-
lities.  Whereas  before  undertaking  the  oath,  she  may  have
been  entitled  to  discount  certain  responsibilities  towards
strangers,  in  favour  of  other  responsibilities  of  slightly  les-
ser  absolute  weight  owed  to  friends  and  family,  now  perhaps
she  must  put  those  strangers’  interests  in  a  higher  position.
So,  for  example,  while  non-medical  personnel  may  be  per-
mitted  to  refuse  to  render  relatively  minor  aid  to  a  stranger
where  doing  so  would  necessitate  missing  his  child’s  piano
recital,  a  medical  professional  who  has  undertaken  certain
professional  oaths  may  not  have  the  same  moral  permission.
With  these  considerations  in  mind,  we  will  put  the  oath  aside
in  order  to  focus  more  broadly  on  the  legitimizing  conditions
for  government  directives  that  any  medical  professional  act
against  her  better  medical  judgment,  given  that  not  all  of
those  professionals  will  have  taken  such  an  oath.
We  have  seen  that  for  a  government  directive  to  be  a  legi-
timately  authoritative  reason  for  the  physician  to  engage  in
complicity,  it  would  have  to  be  based  on  moral  reasons  that
do  not  stem  from  a  pre-existing  moral  duty  on  the  part  of  the
professional  to  render  medical  aid  to  others.  This  is  not  to
say  that  medical  considerations  cannot  play  into  the  reasons
for  the  directive  at  all.  But  they  can’t  be  the  same  medical
considerations  that  would  be  directly  applicable  to  the  phy-
sician  such  that  they  would  already  entail  that  her  medical
obligation  is  to  act  against  the  interests  of  the  patient  in
front  of  her.
To  explore  the  contours  of  such  a  case  more  precisely,  we
will  resort  to  a  time-honoured  technique  in  moral  theory,
the  thought  experiment  [67].  But  the  contours  of  our
thought  experiment  will  not  render  it  the  kind  difﬁcult  to
imagine  ever  taking  place  in  reality.  Imagine  the  legitimate
government  is  concerned  about  public  order  in  a  way  that
dwarfs  its  ability  to  respond  to  threats.  A  long-time  brutal
dictator  has  recently  been  deposed  and  a  democratic
government  has  been  installed.  The  problem  is  that  this
dictator  was  very  popular  among  a  minority  of  the  country.
In  one  area  in  particular,  the  dictator’s  policies  meant  for
particular  hardship  and  oppression  of  the  majority  group  in
order  to  keep  the  minority  in  that  area  in  relative  comfort.
Now,  this  dictator  has  an  illness  that  is  serious  and  life-
threatening,  but  treatable  with  very  expensive  procedures
that  have  not  yet  begun  in  earnest.  Overthrowing  the  dicta-
tor  was  possible  because  of  his  need  to  seek  treatment  and
was  done  while  he  was  in  the  care  of  his  doctors.  Allowing
the  treatment  will  induce  further  hardship  for  the  majority
in  that  particular  area.  Because  of  the  notoriety  of  the  case
and  the  access  of  the  now-free  press,  all  of  this  is  known
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nd  believed  across  the  country,  although  the  tense  political
ituation  in  that  particular  area  is  not  widely  known.  It
ecomes  apparent  that  if  the  physician  treats  her  patient,
here  will  be  an  insurrection  in  that  part  of  the  country  and
any  people  will  die.  Mainly,  these  will  be  members  of  the
inority  who  had  beneﬁted  from  the  policies  of  the  dictator,
ut  that  includes  many  young  children  recently  born  during
he  dictator’s  regime,  which  encouraged  the  minority  in  that
rea  to  have  as  many  children  as  possible.  While  it  would
sually  be  the  government’s  responsibility  to  keep  order  and
ot  the  physician’s,  this  newly  elected  government  is  quite
ragile,  came  to  power  initially  dependent  upon  the  votes
f  the  majority,  and  does  not  yet  have  much  independent
olice  power  in  that  area,  relying  instead  on  the  support  of
he  majority  of  the  local  population.  The  government  would
ot  be  able  to  put  down  the  insurrection  or  prevent  it,  and
e  are  sure  that  many  innocent  people  will  die  as  a  result.
urthermore,  the  insurrection,  if  successful  will  institute
nother  unjust,  authoritarian  regime  with  a  racist  leader
n  that  part  of  the  country,  although  this  time  the  policies
ill  be  directed  against  the  minority  that  had  beneﬁted
efore.  Giving  in  to  the  demands  of  those  threatening  the
nsurrection  will  lead  to  so  much  injustice  that  resisting
he  insurrection  would  clearly  be  the  more  just  option.  If
e  were  to  imagine  that  the  government  had  the  patient
n  question  under  its  direct  control,  we  would  say  that  it
ould  be  the  correct  course  of  action  for  the  government
ot  to  allow  the  patient  to  undergo  treatment  if  it  would
ead  to  the  insurrection.  But  instead,  the  patient  is  not
yet)  in  government  custody  and  its  now  re-instituted  laws
o  not  allow  the  government  to  take  custody  of  any  person
urrently  under  medical  care  for  a  serious  illness.
In  such  a  case,  it  would  seem  that  the  government’s  law-
ul  directive  to  the  physician  not  to  treat  the  patient  would
e  helping  the  physician  to  conform  to  the  best  balance  of
easons.  Furthermore,  the  information  that  not  treating  the
atient  is  in  conformity  with  the  best  balance  of  reasons
s  not  something  that  the  physician  is  likely  to  have  direct
ccess  to  in  such  a  situation,  and  so  the  government’s  direc-
ive  is  helping  the  physician  to  conform  to  the  best  balance
f  reasons  that  apply  to  her.  Finally,  it  still  appears  to  be  a
ase  of  complicity  since,  while  the  physician  refraining  from
reating  the  patient  will  save  more  lives,  those  lives  are  not
nder  immediate  medical  threat.
We  might  be  bothered  by  the  thought  that  risk  to  the  lives
f  the  innocents  is  still  a medical  consideration  and  hence
his  might  still  not  be  a  case  of  complicity.  While  it  does
eem  true  that  once  the  ﬁghting  breaks  out,  there  would
e  a  medical  need  to  treat  the  injured,  it  is  not  the  kind
f  risk  that  would  count  as  a  medical  consideration  before
he  fact.  If  it  helps  to  sharpen  the  example  on  this  front,
magine  that  the  insurrection  would  explode  a device  that
ould  vaporize  all  of  the  threatened  innocents  in  an  instant,
eaving  no  injuries.  In  such  a  situation,  the  threat  to  life  is
ot  one  that  medical  expertise  can  mitigate  directly.  While
e  all  share  the  duty  to  minimize  the  loss  of  life,  the  special
uty  of  medical  professionals  kicks  in  when  their  expertise
s  necessary  to  minimize  that  loss  of  life.  Here,  there  would
e  no  way  that  their  expertise  is  being  called  upon  to  mini-
ize  the  loss  of  life  and  so  their  duty  would  be  the  same  as
veryone  else’s.  The  point  of  the  thought  experiment  is  to
how  that  it  is  possible  for  that  more  general  duty  to  still  be
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reater  than  the  physician’s  professional  medical  duty,  even
hough  we  usually  consider  the  physician’s  medical  duty  to
ome  before  her  other  moral  duties.
We  generally  think  it  is  the  duty  of  governments  to  deal
ith  such  threats,  where  possible,  and  possibly  to  negotiate
round  them.  It  is  usually  the  government’s  responsibility
o  do  so  without  interfering  with  the  physician  and  her
atients.  But  the  thought  experiment  shows  the  possibility
f  a  legitimate  directive  that  requires  complicity  on  the  part
f  the  physician.  Again,  a  virtue  of  Raz’s  service  conception
s  that  it  legitimates  such  directives  on  a  piecemeal  basis.
o,  it  might  legitimately  obligate  certain  physicians  but  not
thers,  perhaps  on  the  basis  of  whom  they  happen  to  be
reating  and  what  the  particular  wider  implications  of  that
reatment  might  be.
Now,  one  complaint  that  might  arise  is  that  it  is  hard
o  imagine  a  law  being  drafted  that  would  cover  such  a
ituation  and  be  legitimate.  That  is,  if  a  law  were  to  direct
octors  not  to  treat  patients  when  ordered  not  to  do  so  by
ertain  government  ofﬁcials  given  the  threat  of  certain  kinds
f  insurrection,  it  is  very  unlikely  for  such  a  law  to  be  gene-
ally  legitimate  (although,  ex  hypothesi,  still  legally  valid).
he  ﬂip-side  of  the  advantage  of  Raz’s  piecemeal  approach,
owever,  is  that  even  a  generally  illegitimate  law  could  be
egitimate  for  certain  people  at  certain  times.  This  is  one
eason  that  even  an  authoritarian  government  may  come  to
ave  greater  legitimacy  in  times  of  disasters  and  emergen-
ies,  and  more  democratic  governments  may  justiﬁably  take
uthoritarian  steps  in  such  emergencies  (consider  whether
ou  think  Lincoln’s  suspension  of  habeas  corpus  during  the
S  Civil  War  was  illegitimate).
One  additional  issue  that  should  be  mentioned  is  how  the
hysician  is  supposed  to  assess  the  legitimacy  of  the  direc-
ive.  This  is  where  the  clash  between  the  physician’s  medical
xpertise  and  the  government’s  central  position  becomes
ost  stark.  While  Raz  says  that  the  legitimacy  of  a  direc-
ive  must  be  ‘‘knowable’’  by  its  subjects  [21,  p.  147—8],
hat  does  not  mean  that  it  must  be  something  about  which
he  subject  would  always  be  correct.  The  key  is  to  remem-
er  that  legitimacy  is  a  fact  about  whether  the  directive  is
apturing  the  best  balance  of  reasons  that  applies  to  the  sub-
ect.  It  is  likely  to  be  very  difﬁcult  to  assess  this,  although
f  the  subject  were  in  possession  of  the  same  facts  as  the
utative  authority,  the  idea  is  that  a  clear-thinking  subject
ould  have  reached  the  same  conclusion.  The  physician  has
reater  knowledge  about  the  condition  and  needs  of  her
atient.  It  may  be  that  the  government  doesn’t  have  access
o  that  information  but  has  other  information  that  militates
gainst  the  treatment  that  the  physician  is  contemplating.
ach,  we  assume,  is  lacking  at  least  some  of  the  information
ossessed  by  the  other.  But  there  is  still  a  fact  about  whe-
her  the  directive  is  justiﬁed  based  on  the  correct  balancing
f  those  considerations.  While  neither  may  have  had  sufﬁ-
ient  information  to  perform  that  balancing  perfectly,  it  is
ossible  that  the  government’s  considerations  would  cover
 wide  range  of  potential  patients  and  conditions.  Where
hose  considerations  wouldn’t  yield  to  the  interests  of  a
iven  patient,  then  the  directive  would  be  illegitimate,  even
hough  the  government  wouldn’t  know  that  and  would  have
till  issued  the  directive.
Another  problem  is  that  intuitions  might  differ  about
ur  though  experiment.  It  is  true  that  those  with  lessK.M.  Ehrenberg
onsequentialist  moral  intuitions  may  think  that  the  physi-
ian’s  duty  is  ﬁxed  by  the  patient’s  interest  regardless  of  the
utcome.  In  the  starkest  form,  we  can  lay  this  intuition  aside
s  begging  the  question  against  the  possibility  of  ever  allo-
ing  for  legitimate  medical  complicity.  But  as  long  as  one’s
oral  beliefs  allow  for  the  possibility  of  conﬂicting  duties,
t  does  appear  possible  for  certain  kinds  of  more  general
uties  to  come  into  conﬂict  with  the  physician’s  medical
uties  in  a  way  that  those  more  general  duties  still  win  out.
What  we  have  seen  is  that  it  is  possible  to  justify  medi-
al  complicity  in  the  face  of  a  government  directive  not  to
xercise  a  physician’s  best  medical  judgment  with  regard  to
 given  patient.  While  such  cases  are  likely  quite  rare,  com-
licity  would  be  morally  justiﬁed  where  the  non-medical
onsiderations  upon  which  the  directive  was  based  are
nes  that  would  themselves  undermine  the  physician’s  pre-
xisting  moral  duty  to  treat  the  patient.
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